Secrets are encrypted before storage
The app performs secret encryption locally, so the service is designed around storing encrypted bundles plus metadata rather than readable secret bodies.
The strongest trust signal here is precision: what the secure messaging app does, what the browser viewer does, and where access control, device binding, or Tor-aware transport hardening actually lives.
The app performs secret encryption locally, so the service is designed around storing encrypted bundles plus metadata rather than readable secret bodies.
The current website opens secrets and serves legal/public pages. It is not presented as a full authenticated dashboard or browser creation studio.
Ticket validation, link fragments, and optional device-binding challenge flows add explicit control boundaries around secret retrieval.
The mobile app encrypts the secret locally, packages metadata, and uploads the ciphertext bundle to the backend.
The user distributes an Anomonus link, QR code, or PNG-hidden link that carries the secret route and optional key fragment.
The recipient enters a passcode, requests a one-time ticket, and may need device-bound challenge verification for protected secrets.
The browser or app fetches ciphertext with the ticket and performs client-side decrypt, with burn-after-read and lifecycle rules applied after access.
Anomonus should clearly state that the mobile app authors secrets and the web surface primarily opens them.
The product story should keep repeating the key fact: encryption happens locally before upload, and decrypt happens locally after ticketed fetch.
Browser support, device-binding boundaries, settings-driven hardening, and backend inference limits should be explained without marketing fog.